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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ATTACKS ON EXECUTIVES: REVIVAL OF THE INVASION OF
MANAGEMENT DEFENSE AND PUBLIC UTILITY AUTONOMY

As the Chief Executive Officer of Westar Energy, Inc., James Haines Jr.
oversees the largest power company in Kansas, a company that provides power
to a good portion of Kansas and parts of several other states. Through years of
education and experience working in this field and with this company, Mr.
Haines has gained a deeper understanding of the business needs that present
themselves on a day-to-day basis. Armed with this knowledge and the support
of shareholders and employees throughout the company, Mr. Haines provides
business decisions that aim at improving Westar’s profitability.
Now consider that a commission composed of appointed officials, lacking
the experience and knowledge specific to Westar’s management, secondguesses Mr. Haines’s managerial decisions and stipulates how Westar will
finance its business. Originally implemented to protect the public from rate
increases, this commission slowly usurps the role of Westar’s executives and
begins to effectively “manage” portions of Westar’s electric business.
The scenario just presented is occurring in some form on a day-to-day
basis in almost every state and is threatening the autonomy of management in
the public utility industry. In the wake of Enron, WorldCom, and the
California energy crisis, business decisions are viewed with great skepticism.1
As a consequence of this heightened scrutiny, public utility companies like
Westar are increasingly subjected to more intrusive regulation than ever before
in an effort to protect the best interests of the public. Furthermore, public
utility commissions (hereinafter referred to generally as “commissions”),
originally designed to prevent unconscionable rate increases, have started to

1. See Rebecca Smith, Shock Waves: Enron’s Swoon Leaves a Grand Experiment in a State
of Disarray, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2001, at A1 (describing the uncertainty in the energy market
since the fall of Enron and the California energy crisis). California was the first large state to
deregulate its electricity market, and since this time, prices have spiked higher than forty percent,
and there have been a series of intermittent blackouts. Id. General Electric Co. Chairman and
Chief Executive Jeffrey Immelt recently spoke to shareholders in the wake of the Enron collapse
and described the widespread uncertainty in today’s market that has lead to the increased
skepticism of public utility companies. Rachel Emma Silverman, GE’s Immelt Says Lowered
Stock Price Upsets Him, Too, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2002, at A6. “We live in a new age,” he
stated. Id. “Performance is not enough. When a trillion or so in New Economy market cap goes
up in smoke. When advisers rate a stock a ‘buy’ and it goes bankrupt a couple weeks later.
When the system designed to provide confidence in the numbers falls apart. It changes things.”
Id.
629
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exude greater control over the internal operations of public utilities. In order to
effectively balance a commission’s goals and those of a public utility, courts
must develop a usable test that can be uniformly applied.
Regulatory bodies are generally viewed as beneficial to the public, but
many people fail to realize the entire scope of their impact on ratepayers, and
subsequently on the economy. When public utilities suffer from tight control
and a restriction of management’s judgment, the ratepayers can be
inadvertently harmed. Corporate budgets are restricted, maintenance and
construction are reduced, people lose their jobs, and the utility industry suffers
due to the increased regulation by commissions.2 The United States Supreme
Court has stated: “It must never be forgotten that, while the state may regulate
with a view to enforcing reasonable rates and charges, it is not the owner of the
property of public utility companies, and is not clothed with the general power
of management incident to ownership.”3 State courts have followed this
directive. For example, the Supreme Court of Wyoming announced: “Not only
is the participation by a state agency in a utility’s business decisions
unnecessary to regulation, it is impermissible.”4
From this rationale emerged what is commonly referred to as the “Invasion
of Management” defense. While this defense recognizes that regulatory
commissions have authority to protect ratepayers from rate hikes, it also limits
commissions’ power. In its simplest form, the Invasion of Management
defense prevents commissions from inhibiting expansion, acquisitions, and
financing options that are viewed by management as necessary business
activities.5
In Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Public Service
Commission,6 the Supreme Court of Wyoming recognized that some courts
were starting to restrict the Invasion of Management defense. The court
explained that “in General Telephone Company of California v. Public
Utilities Commission the court said ‘that the “invasion of management”
rationale now appears to be disfavored’ because judicial limitations were
increasingly imposed upon what once had been perceived as within
‘management functions’ of utilities.”7

2. The utilities industry employed 666,200 people in 1995, however, this figure has
declined to 570,200 in 2004. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INDUSTRY
AT A GLANCE: NAICS 48-49 & 22: TRANSPORTATION AND WAREHOUSING, AND UTILITIES,
available at http://www.bls.gov/iag/transportutil.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
3. Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 289 (1923).
4. Pac. Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 677 P.2d 799, 810 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose,
J., specially concurring).
5. See id. at 807–09 (majority opinion).
6. 745 P.2d 563 (Wyo. 1987).
7. Id. at 569 (quoting 670 P.2d 349, 354 n.10 (Cal. 1983)) (internal citation omitted).
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However, Wyoming’s high court went on to conclude that
[t]his prognostication by the Supreme Court of California may not be
entirely accurate. It does not cognize a rather delicate but definite line that
must be drawn between regulated but free enterprise and socialization. Free
enterprise assumes the responsibility of management to investors for
management’s decisions.
Permitting civil servants to make those
determinations instead of management results in no accountability for those
decisions to investors in the business. That is not compatible with even
regulated monopolies in a free enterprise system. We prefer the view
heretofore espoused that extensions of power by judicial construction beyond
that conferred upon an agency by the legislature, either specifically or
generally, is inappropriate because:
“An administrative board has no power or authority other than that
particularly conferred upon it by statute or by construction necessary to
accomplish the aims of the statute.”8

This Comment will explain why the Invasion of Management defense is
not extinct and illustrate how it serves as a more doctrinally sound approach to
interpreting how far a public utility commission’s power extends. To do so,
this Comment will first analyze the composition of public utility companies
and the role the Invasion of Management defense plays in preserving this
structure. Next, this Comment will take a look at some of the important
opinions throughout history that have shaped and defined the Invasion of
Management defense. Finally, this Comment will walk through a recent
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) order and analyze the present
and future application of the Invasion of Management defense to this decision.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INVASION
OF MANAGEMENT DEFENSE
The United States operates under a free-market economy. In its purest
form, market forces (supply and demand) and governmental regulation
determine the level of output and the ultimate price of goods. Business in the
United States has long operated under this framework, with management
tailoring its competitive decisions to this model. Moreover, “[e]conomists and
other policy experts around the world are increasingly skeptical about the
necessity and effectiveness of government regulation and more confident in
free market forces.”9 With this in mind, it is important to first describe how
the government regulates public utilities. Then, it will be easier to see why
there is a movement toward opening the electric utility industry to the benefits
8. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Tri-County Elec. Ass’n. v. City of Gillette, 525 P.2d 3, 9
(Wyo. 1974)).
9. Laura R. Starling, Comment, Don’t Be Shocked! Electric Utility Deregulation Can
Benefit Low-Cost States, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1519, 1525 (2000).
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of a free market economy and greater competition among industry
participants.10
The major sectors of the economy are composed of private and
government businesses. There is, however, another form of business that is a
hybrid of these, upon which this Comment focuses: public utilities.
Because a state may, under the police power, regulate a business affected with
a public interest, and because the prime characteristic of a public utility is that
of public use or service, a state may regulate and control a public utility to
protect the public interests and to promote the health, comfort, safety, and
welfare of the people.11

Pursuant to the Federal Power Act,12 the United States possesses the right to
regulate public utilities.13 The right of states to regulate private companies that
affect the public is also a creation of legislature and was affirmed in Munn v.
Illinois in 1876.14 Public utilities are subject to regulation and afforded
financial safeguards because of the unique position they occupy in business.
Because of the monopolistic characteristics of their business,15 and the simple

10. See id.
11. 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Utilities § 15 (2005). It is at the legislature’s discretion to decide
what interests are to be promoted and what measures serve to promote these interests. Id. While
the state can control the manner in which utilities conduct their business, they cannot control the
manager of the utility. Id. “In the absence of a clear and lawful limitation, a regulated public
utility has all the rights granted by, and the duties imposed by, general law.” Id. § 13.
12. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a–825r (2000).
13. E.g., id. § 824(a).
It is declared that the business of transmitting and selling electric energy for ultimate
distribution to the public is affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation of
matters relating to generation to the extent provided in this subchapter and subchapter III
of this chapter and of that part of such business which consists of the transmission of
electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in
interstate commerce is necessary in the public interest, such Federal regulation, however,
to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.
Id. While this section limits federal power to those areas not subject to regulation by the states, it
also applies “to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of
electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” Id. § 824(b).
14. 94 U.S. 113 (1876); see, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. 9, § 18 (The Commission shall have the
power and authority and be charged with the duty of supervising, regulating and controlling all
transportation and transmission companies doing business in this State, in all matters relating to
the performance of their public duties and their charges therefor . . . .”).
15. Joan G. Fickinger, Comment, Jurisdiction of State Regulatory Commissions Over Public
Utility Holding Company Diversification, 15 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 87, 89 n.12 (1983) (citing C.
WILCOX & W. SHEPHERD, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 334 (5th ed. 1975)). Public
utilities can be divided into two categories of competitiveness: “monopolies” (consisting of
telephone, electric power, natural gas, and sewage companies) and “partially competitive”
companies (consisting of railroads, pipelines, and cable providers). Id.
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fact that electricity is different from deregulated businesses, policy favors
preventing rather than promoting competition among public utilities.16
“[A] natural monopoly is a situation where a single company tends to
become the only supplier of a product or service over time because the nature
of that product or service makes a single supplier more efficient than multiple,
competing ones.”17 In other words, companies like public utilities take
advantage of economies of scale and markets that are particularly expensive to
enter. These advantages are formed in the utility industry because “the average
cost of providing electricity falls as output increases.”18 As a result, policy
favors regulating these monopolies rather than subjecting them to potentially
destructive competition.19
Electric utilities are generally composed of three sectors: generation,
transmission, and distribution.20 Historically, there have been vertically
integrated utilities (generation, transmission, and distribution), generation and
transmission (G&T) utilities, and distribution companies (usually small
cooperatives and municipal utilities).21 Public utilities are privately owned, but
are heavily regulated by state commissions and the FERC at the federal level.22
The state and federal governments then define the limits of the commission’s
powers through statutory law.23 In almost every state this power is restricted
and only permits commissions to act when companies take actions that will
affect rates.24 However, in states like Kansas, regulatory commissions are also

16. Spencer Weber Waller, Competition, Consumer Protection and Energy Deregulation: A
Conference Introduction, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 749, 754 (2002) (“Electricity is necessary for
modern life. It has few reasonably effective substitutes, and it has a substantially inelastic
demand curve making consumers vulnerable to price increases in times of shortage or when faced
with exercise of market power.”).
17. Ipedia, Internet Encyclopedia, http://www.ipedia.com/natural_monopoly.html (last
visited Mar. 25, 2006).
18. Starling, supra note 9, at 1521. “For example, . . . once the utility company has incurred
the fixed cost of stringing thousands of miles of lines, it costs less and less to serve additional
customers.” Id. at 1521–22. However, technological advances in the gas industry have allowed
smaller gas-fired generating plants to produce energy more efficiently, and as a result, the
monopolistic characteristics of the energy market have been eliminated to an extent. Id. at 1523.
19. Ipedia, supra note 17. Many groups have lobbied to be treated as natural monopolies to
take advantage of stable prices, a reduced risk of competition, and a guaranteed return for
shareholders. Id.
20. Id. at 1521.
21. Id. When all three functions are performed by a vertically integrated utility, the end
product is traditionally sold as a single product to the consumer. Id.
22. Waller, supra note 16, at 754.
23. See Note, “Management Invaded”—A Real or False Defense?, 5 STAN. L. REV. 110,
111 (1952) [hereinafter Management Invaded].
24. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 37-2-121 (1999) (empowering the commission to act
when it determines a rate “to be inadequate or unremunerative, or to be unjust, or unreasonable,
or unjustly discriminatory, or unduly preferential”).
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generally charged with ensuring that the utility provides “efficient and
sufficient service,” referring to both economic efficiency and reliability.25
Because commissions’ power is delegated by the legislature, the
commissions can only exercise the portion of police power that has been
specifically delegated to them.26 Statutory grants, however, often result in
general grants of power, which incite interpretation problems for courts.27
Because of these interpretation issues, troubles often arise when commissions
attempt to restrict the operations of public utilities beyond the specific statutory
grants of power to commissions. Beyond statutory limitations, commissions
are also limited by constitutions.28 The Federal Constitution is generally the
basis for a constitutional challenge, since state constitutions rarely enter the
cases.29 Thus, commissions’ attempts to over-regulate public utilities are

25. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-101b (2002).
Every electric public utility governed by this act shall be required to furnish reasonably
efficient and sufficient services and facilities for the use of any and all products or services
rendered, furnished, supplied or produced by such electric public utility, to establish just
and reasonable rates, charges and exactions and to make just and reasonable rules,
classifications and regulations. Every unjust or unreasonably discriminatory or unduly
preferential rule, regulation, classification, rate, charge or exaction is prohibited and is
unlawful and void. The commission shall have the power, after notice and hearing in
accordance with the provisions of the Kansas administrative procedure act, to require all
electric public utilities governed by this act to establish and maintain just and reasonable
rates when the same are reasonably necessary in order to maintain reasonably sufficient
and efficient service from such electric public utilities.
Id. (emphasis added).
26. Management Invaded, supra note 23, at 111.
27. Id. at 112–13.
28. Id. at 113.
29. Id. California expressly makes the legislature superior to their constitution, while other
states approach the problem instead through federal means. Id.; see also CAL. CONST. art. 12, §
5.
The Legislature has plenary power, unlimited by the other provisions of this constitution
but consistent with this article, to confer additional authority and jurisdiction upon the
commission, to establish the manner and scope of review of commission action in a court
of record, and to enable it to fix just compensation for utility property taken by eminent
domain.
Id. In Kansas, for example, “The commission is given full power, authority and jurisdiction to
supervise and control the electric public utilities, as defined in K.S.A. 66-101a, doing business in
Kansas, and is empowered to do all things necessary and convenient for the exercise of such
power, authority and jurisdiction.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-101. While there have been numerous
challenges to state commission rulings, these challenges have almost uniformly turned on the
commissions’ interpretations of their delegated authority, not the constitutionality of the
commissions’ orders. See, e.g., Jones v. Kan. Gas & Elec. Co., 565 P.2d 597 (Kan. 1977); Cent.
Kan. Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 561 P.2d 779 (Kan. 1977); Sekan Elec. Coop. Ass’n v.
State Corp. Comm’n, 609 P.2d 188 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980).
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occasionally viewed as an unlawful taking of property without due process,30
or as an unlawful taking due to a lack of just compensation.31 However,
commerce clause and due process challenges are often applied non-uniformly
and without clarity, and as a result, the Invasion of Management defense is
most commonly confined to limitations intrinsic to the statutory grants
themselves.32
With these limitations in mind, “[t]he legal issue [becomes] whether or not
the commission has power to make the order”; in other words, “whether the
subject of the order is the business of management or of regulation.”33
Therefore, whenever a commission restricts a decision that should have been
properly left to management, courts label that intrusion an “Invasion of
Management.”34 But the Invasion of Management defense is not just a way of
classifying a statutory or constitutional violation; there are also limitations to
the power of managerial regulation that has been assigned to commissions.35
Statutory power, in the form of general grants to commissions, clearly
refers to regulatory power over services and facilities in the area of “direct
contact” between the consumer and the utility.36 It is in this area that the
Invasion of Management rationale provides two limits on the power of
commissions to regulate. First, commissions have the power to decide what
services or facilities are available to the public, but not how these services or
facilities are to be provided.37 Second, a “convenience-necessity rule” has
developed to limit commissions’ power to regulate even if they are regulating
in the area of what services or facilities are to be offered.38 This is most
commonly applied when a utility wishes to abandon services, and requires that
the commission show public necessity to deny the utility permission to

30. Management Invaded, supra note 23, at 115 (citing Atl. Coast Line v. Corp. Comm’n,
206 U.S. 1, 20 (1907)).
31. Id. (citing Del. L. & W. R.R. v. Town of Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928)).
32. Id. at 114–16.
33. Id. at 111.
34. See id.
35. Management Invaded, supra note 23, at 117. Courts often refer to limitations on
regulation in excess of the constitutional limits provided in that state or by the Federal
Constitution. Id. at 118.
36. Id. at 118. “Commission orders are uniformly upheld when the managerial decision
‘invaded’ is clearly within the area of direct consumer-utility contact.” Id. at 119. For example,
in Southern Pacific Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 260 P.2d 70, 73 (Cal. 1953), part 2 of the
order by the commission was not challenged as an Invasion of Management as it dealt with
facilities in direct contact with the consumer. Part 2 ordered “[t]hat other trains of [Southern
Pacific Company] (‘The Senator’ and ‘The El Dorado’) be ‘refurbished to a standard comparable
to modern, railway passenger equipment.’” Id. at 72.
37. Management Invaded, supra note 23, at 120.
38. Id. at 123.
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abandon the service.39 Whenever a commission oversteps one of these limits
on its power to regulate, the commission has “invaded management.” Thus,
courts do draw lines within the limits specifically granted in statutes, but where
this line is drawn between commissions and management is not always clear.40
Over time, trends in the case law have been anything but consistent, and based
on recent FERC decisions, commentators have recognized that “a clear trend is
emerging toward heightened scrutiny of financial transactions involving public
utilities and their nonutility parents and affiliates.”41 As a result, the Invasion
of Management defense will often be implicated in situations involving
affiliates of electric companies. The effects of this situation will be explored in
depth in the Westar case outlined in this Comment.
II. OPINIONS SHAPING THE INVASION OF MANAGEMENT DEFENSE
A.

Developing the Prongs of the Defense

As early as 1923, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that
certain areas of a public utility’s business were reserved for management. In
Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service
Commission, the Public Service Commission of Missouri (the “Missouri
Commission”) directed Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (SBC) to
reduce its service rates and to eliminate its charges for installation and moving
expenses.42 SBC produced evidence as to the valuation of its property to show
the Missouri Commission that its charges were warranted.43 Independent
valuations also revealed that the Missouri Commission’s valuations were
substantially lower than actual market value.44 As a result, the United States
Supreme Court overruled an earlier judgment for the Missouri Commission
and held that it was not warranted in disallowing an installation charge because
management had the right to exercise its discretion.45
The Court explained that “[i]t must never be forgotten that, while the state
may regulate with a view to enforcing reasonable rates and charges, it is not
the owner of the property of public utility companies, and is not clothed with
the general power of management incident to ownership.”46 The Court went
on to emphasize that “the [Missouri Commission] is not the financial manager

39. Id.
40. See id. at 117.
41. Teresa B. Salamone et al., Increased FERC Scrutiny of Financing Activities by Public
Utilities, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2003, at 28, 31.
42. 262 U.S. 276, 282 (1923).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 288.
45. Id. at 288–89.
46. Id. at 289.
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of the corporation, and it is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that
of the directors of the corporation . . . .”47
Even though the Missouri Commission was regulating rates in Missouri ex
rel. Southwestern Bell, the Supreme Court found that there were limits on its
power beyond those specifically provided in statutes. Furthermore, while this
decision was not cast in Invasion of Management language, it would serve as a
building block for future utilities arguing that their managerial autonomy had
been invaded. Since this decision, actions by commissions have strayed well
beyond simply regulating rates, and have thus evoked greater concern that they
are beyond a public utility commission’s prescribed powers.
After the Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell decision, more than twentyfive years passed without any significant decisions in this area. Although
decisions were handed down restricting commission power, there were no
egregious intrusions on management’s power. But then, in 1950, the Supreme
Court of California set the standard for what is now referred to as the Invasion
of Management rationale in its Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission48 decision.
In Pacific Telephone, two orders by the Public Utilities Commission of the
State of California (the “California Commission”) were challenged as usurping
the functions of internal management.49 American Telephone and Telegraph
Company (AT&T) owned almost ninety percent of Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph Company’s (PT&T) capital stock, and received one percent of
PT&T’s gross receipts for its services regularly provided to PT&T.50 The
California Commission viewed this as an exaction by a more powerful AT&T
company and ordered that each transaction be viewed individually and that
AT&T be paid only for specific services provided for that particular
transaction.51 PT&T recognized that the California Commission could prevent
payments that it viewed as excessive, but argued that the California
Commission was without power to usurp management’s role by prescribing
contract terms for them.52 At the time, California had not expressly granted the
California Commission the power to regulate payments between an operating
utility and its affiliated parent company, so the court looked to determine if any

47. 263 U.S. at 289 (quoting States Pub. Utils. Comm’n ex rel. Springfield v. Springfield
Gas & Elec. Co., 125 N.E. 891, 901 (1920)).
48. 215 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1950).
49. Id. at 442.
50. Id.
51. Id. Specifically, the order required that only reasonable costs be paid to AT&T,
determined by what it would actually cost AT&T within its own organization. Id. Furthermore,
PT&T was required to file bimonthly reports explaining any transactions with AT&T and to
avoid exceeding a $2,250,000 annual basis without approval from the California Commission.
Id. at 442–43.
52. Id. at 443.
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statutes currently granting the California Commission power would allow this
order.53
The Public Utilities Act of California served two broad purposes: (1) it
allowed the California Commission to regulate the service and rates between
the consumer and the utility, and (2) it required commission approval of either
the sale or encumbrance of property and the issuance of new securities.54
However, the court pointed out that the Act did not provide the California
Commission with the “power to regulate the contracts by which the utility
secures the labor, materials, and services necessary for the conduct of its
business, whether such contracts are made with affiliated corporations or
others.”55 The California Commission was not permitted to regulate areas that
were not impressed with direct contact between the utility and the consumer,
such as affiliate contract terms.56
The court began by recognizing that almost every contract a public utility
enters into will affect its rates in one way or another.57 However, the court
went on to emphasize that “[t]he determination of what is reasonable in
conducting the business of the utility is the primary responsibility of
Furthermore, the court found that if the California
management.”58
Commission is able to substitute its judgment for that of management in
contract making and the general business of utilities, then it is able to assume
management of all utilities in its jurisdiction.59 The court noted that even if
management were derelict in its duties, the law does not justify taking away
control of the company or vesting ownership with the public simply because
the company is a regulated “public” utility.60
The court then went through a brief history of instances where courts
prevented commission intervention, explaining that other courts using statutes
similar to those in California only allow contract modification where the
contract impacts rates and services directly.61 Although precedent in the area
53. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 P.2d at 443–44. At this time, many state legislatures had
enacted statutes to protect consumers from potential abuses that could occur between a utility and
its parent company. See Legislation, 49 HARV. L. REV. 957, 982–89 (1936) (analyzing states’
regulation of service contracts).
54. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 P.2d at 444.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 445.
58. Id.
59. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 P.2d at 445.
60. Id.
61. Id. The court noted that previously, in Hollywood Chamber of Commerce v. Railroad
Commission, the court held that the Railroad Commission could not require the Hollywood
Chamber of Commerce to discontinue paying dividends to expand into profitable fields that the
utility was not currently involved in, since it was properly management’s choice. Id. (citing 219
P. 983 (Cal. 1923)). Along the same lines, the court cited Southern Pacific Co. v. Railroad

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

ATTACKS ON EXECUTIVES

639

was not strong yet, the court elected to emphasize the need for direct contact
between the utility and the consumer in order for a commission to permissibly
intervene in management’s decisions.62
Therefore, with the limited precedent before it, the court reiterated that the
contract between PT&T and AT&T was not hampering the plaintiff’s service
to the public.63 The court explained that the situation was no different than any
other where management disagrees with a commission on the profitability of
an expenditure, but decides to go forward with the expenditure, even though it
cannot recover the costs from ratepayers should it prove unprofitable.64 Based
on this reasoning, the court effectively outlined the first part of the Invasion of
Management rationale: In order to regulate, a commission must be dealing
with an area impressed with direct utility–consumer contact. Future litigation
between commissions and public utility companies would invoke Pacific
Telephone’s framework in part or in whole for many years to come.65
The next several years provided few “landmark” decisions, yet these
decisions were important in further developing a framework for analyzing
problems between commissions and public utility companies. Three years
after Pacific Telephone, the Supreme Court of California issued an opinion that
commissions would cling to for a number of years. In Southern Pacific Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission,66 the court affirmed the Public Utilities
Commission’s order directing Southern Pacific Company to substitute modern
railway passenger cars for its outdated steam locomotives.67 The court did not
make a single mention of Pacific Telephone, but responded to the Invasion of
Management argument by stating that the language of sections 730, 761, 762,
and 763 of the California Public Utilities Code specifically authorized the
commission’s order.68 Although commissions interpreted this opinion as

Commission, which found that there is a “zone of reasonableness” within which management is
allowed to prescribe its own rates. Id. (citing 87 P.2d 1055, 1070 (Cal. 1939)). The court noted
that other courts using statutes similar to those in California allowed contract modification only
where the contract impacted rates and services directly. Id.
62. See id. at 445–46.
63. Id. at 447.
64. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 P.2d at 447.
65. See, e.g., Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 604 n.11 (Cal.
1979); Credit Ins. Gen. Agents Ass’n v. Payne, 547 P.2d 993, 997–98 (Cal. 1976); Stepak v. Am.
Tel. and Tel. Co., 231 Cal Rptr. 37, 40–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Gen. Tel. Co. v. Lundy, 218
N.E.2d 274, 277 (N.Y. 1966). Even though Pacific Telephone has been criticized in recent years,
it has withstood judicial scrutiny to the present day.
66. 260 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1953) (en banc).
67. Id. at 72, 79.
68. Id. at 78.
[The Sections] empower the commission to “determine the kind and character of facilities
and the extent of the operation thereof, necessary reasonably and adequately to meet
public requirements for services furnished by common carriers.” By Section 761 it is
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broadening their general grants of statutory power, the opinion actually only
reinforced the principles inherent in the Invasion of Management rationale. In
other words, management is prohibited from complaining when a commission
prescribes what services or facilities a utility can provide and acts in
accordance with specific statutory grants.
Several years after this opinion, other courts began to build on the Pacific
Telephone and Southern Pacific Co. opinions and recognize that commissions
could not prescribe how services were to be provided even in areas of direct
consumer contact. In Rhode Island Consumers’ Council v. Smith,69 the Rhode
Island Public Utilities Commission directed a utility to include a one-dollar per
month discount for senior citizens (65 years or older) in any new tariff that the
utility added to its rates.70 The court noted that while management is allowed
to classify a gift as an operating expense in certain situations, courts have
never authorized public utility commissions to “invade management’s province
by directing a utility to make a charitable contribution.”71 Thus, the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island found that commissions could not regulate rates that
were lawfully established.72 As the courts had already determined in Southern
Pacific Co., commissions are only permitted to regulate what services and
facilities a utility provides to its consumers, not how the services are provided.
The cases that followed Smith in the next nineteen years added little to
Invasion of Management jurisprudence. However, in 1984, courts around the
country again began to embark on decisions cast in this language. The modern
Invasion of Management jurisprudence has expanded commissions’ power
somewhat as courts are erring on the side of over-regulation. Even so, courts
have not provided commissions with unbridled control over the operations of a
utility. A 1984 decision from the Supreme Court of Wyoming made it clear
that courts concentrate on one more issue in determining whether a
commission has invaded management’s prerogative.
In Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Commission,73 the Public
Service Commission of Wyoming (the “Wyoming Commission”) determined
that losses in a nuclear power construction project should be borne by the
stockholders of Pacific Power & Light Company (PP&L) and not by the

provided that whenever the commission, after a hearing finds that the equipment of the
utility is inadequate it shall determine and by order require the proper equipment to be
employed. Section 762 contains language to similar effect. And Section 763 authorizes
the commission, upon hearing and findings, to require adequate train services as to time
schedules, equipment and transportation facilities.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
69. 302 A.2d 757 (R.I. 1973).
70. Id. at 775.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 677 P.2d 799 (Wyo. 1984).
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consumers.74 The court explained that the decision to undertake the project
was that of management and the representatives of PP&L after calculating the
risk and possible return.75 Moreover, there would be no risk at all to PP&L if
the consumers were to bear the loss, and PP&L would thus undertake projects
that had even a very small chance of success.76 The majority reasoned,
therefore, that consumers could not bear the risk of a faulty project unless
PP&L obtained approval from the Wyoming Commission prior to undertaking
the project.77 The Supreme Court made it clear that this decision was justified
because there was a public necessity to prevent the utility from imposing the
costs of an unsuccessful project on the public.78 Thus, the Supreme Court of
Wyoming established the final prong of the Invasion of Management defense:
a commission wishing to prevent utility action (here, imposing the costs of a
failed project) must show a public necessity, rather than public convenience, to
deny the utility permission to perform the action.
B.

Modern Decisions Defining the Limits of the Invasion of Management
Defense

Two years after the final prong of the Invasion of Management defense
was established in Pacific Power and Light Co., the California courts returned
to their jurisprudence in this area and restricted a decision they had handed

74. Id. at 806.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 808–09. But see id. at 809–11 (Rose, J., specially concurring) (explaining that
permitting the utility to recover its investments in terminated projects if the proposal was first
submitted to the commission would exceed the scope of the statute).
78. Pac. Power & Light Co., 677 P.2d at 808–09. At about the same time, a similar decision
was handed down in Pennsylvania. In Duquesne Light Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission, the court again sided with a commission, but reiterated the most important boundary
regulating decisions in this area. 507 A.2d 1274 (Pa. 1986). The court cited the Pennsylvania
Public Utility Code, stating that “[i]t is a fundamental principle of public utility law that a utility
may not recover costs from its ratepayers unless such costs have been determined to be just and
reasonable.” Id. at 1278. However, the court stated that while the Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission (the “Pennsylvania Commission”) had power to regulate utilities when their conduct
affected the public, the Commission’s power to insert itself into the role of management was
restricted, unless there existed a public necessity. Id. With the Code’s language in mind, the
Court found that the Pennsylvania Commission could establish a mine price cap formula for
determining market price, because the costs of coal were being directly passed on to the
consumers. Id. at 1279–81. The coal mine that Duquesne Light Company (“Duquesne”) had
developed some years back was producing coal at cost higher than local prices. See id. at 1281.
While the Pennsylvania Commission allowed the recovery of some deferred costs, it did not
permit full recovery since Duquesne’s management chose to undertake the project. Id.
Consequently, the court seemed to proffer a basic rule: commissions can only regulate in an area
that protects consumer interests when there is a possibility of increased rates. See id. at 1278.
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down only three years earlier.79 In Stepak v. American Telephone and
Telgraph Co.,80 AT&T owned over ninety percent of the voting shares of
PT&T, while Stepak (an individual shareholder) owned some of the remaining
shares.81 In 1981, PT&T applied with the Public Utility Commission (PUC) to
merge with a subsidiary of AT&T and eliminate all minority voting power in
PT&T.82 The PUC approved the merger, and as a result, AT&T gained
complete voting control in the merged companies.83 In the process, the PUC
likened the minority shareholders to ratepayers, but found that their interests
would not be adversely affected because they were receiving a fair price for
their shares.84
On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, First District, Stepak first
challenged the jurisdiction of the PUC to adjudicate issues regarding minority
shareholders.85 Likening the current case to Pacific Telephone, the court found
no power, granted or implied, that allowed the PUC to decide whether the
merger was fair to minority shareholders, and it concluded that the PUC did
not have jurisdiction to make this determination and that the minority
shareholders had a legitimate claim.86
The California Supreme Court, in General Telephone Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission,87 then discussed the recent language limiting the
Invasion of Management rationale.88 There the court explained that the Pacific
Telephone decision and the Invasion of Management rationale had been cast
into doubt, noting the decisions in Southern Pacific Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission89 and Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission90 as
support for this proposition.91 Therefore, the California Supreme Court,
drawing support from various Public Utilities Code provisions, rejected

79. As more recent decisions have indicated (as discussed infra in this section), California
has developed this area of law more than any other state, and this decision would once again
instill life into proponents of the “management invaded” defense.
80. 231 Cal. Rptr. 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
81. Id. at 38.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 39.
84. Id.
85. Stepak, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
86. Id. at 40–42.
87. 670 P.2d 349 (Cal. 1983).
88. Id. at 352–56.
89. 260 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1953) (en banc) (discussed supra in text accompanying notes 66–68).
90. 288 P. 775, 779 (Cal. 1930) (holding that the commission’s order requiring the
construction of a new terminal was supported by numerous statutory provisions).
91. Gen. Tel. Co., 670 P.2d at 353–54. However, the court was quick to note that “Atchison
and Southern Pacific can, of course, be distinguished from Pac. Tel. in that they deal directly with
the commission’s power over service,” emphasizing that it still considered the defense to be
disfavored. Id. at 354 n.10.
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General Telephone Company’s argument.92 The court explained that unlike
Pacific Telephone, the commission in General Telephone Co. was only trying
to provide better service and thus regulate the direct “relationship of the utility
to the consumer.”93
With this precedent in mind, the Stepak court opined that “the ‘invasion of
management rationale,’ while near terminal ‘in the area of “direct consumerutility contact,”’ has life in areas other than direct consumer-utility contact.”94
Because Stepak’s actions had no effect on rates or services in this case,95 the
Invasion of Management rationale applied to limit the PUC’s power in areas
without direct contact between consumers and the utility.96 Thus, while it was
clear that commissions could regulate areas impressed with direct consumer–
utility contact, it was uncertain whether courts would speak of the how/why
distinction and public necessity/convenience prongs of the defense in the
future.
Less than one year later, a Wyoming Court would be the first to recognize
that the Invasion of Management rationale had not deteriorated, setting the
stage for a continued revival of the defense over the next several years.
In the case of In re Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.,97 the
Wyoming Commission ordered Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Company (MST&T) to rescind a recent transfer of its directory publishing
division to its sister corporation and instead submit its directory publication to
competitive bidding.98 The court, however, held that there was not a sufficient
“connection between the revenue produced by the directory publishing service
and the rates that [MST&T] ultimately charged for those services which are
furnished ‘to or for the public’” for the Wyoming Commission to exercise
jurisdiction over MST&T’s business transaction.99
In reaching its decision the court reiterated its own language just three
years earlier in Pacific Power and Light: “[A commission] is not in a position
to take on any aspect of utility management. It must restrict its position to
92. The court noted that sections 701, 728, and 761 of the California Public Utility Code
were “ample to sustain the challenged order.” Id. at 356.
93. Id. at 353. Consequently, while the court noted that the Invasion of Management
defense had been cast into doubt, it still based its decision within the parameters of the defense.
See id. at 353–55.
94. Stepak v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 231 Cal. Rptr. 37, 43 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co., 670 P.2d at 356) (internal citations omitted).
95. According to the court, “[The PUC] in this case expressly concluded that . . . the merger
would not have any direct effect on the terms, conditions or cost of service provided to California
ratepayers,” since the PUC instituted an additional protective measure to offset ratemaking
adjustments. Id. at 43.
96. Id.
97. 745 P.2d 563 (Wyo. 1987).
98. Id. at 564.
99. Id. at 570.
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‘regulation’ with management decisions being entirely that of the utility.”100
While the court recognized the recent language in General Telephone, stating
that “the ‘invasion of management’ rationale now appears to be disfavored,”101
the court went on to conclude that “[t]his prognostication by the Supreme
Court of California may not be entirely accurate.”102 Statutes give the
Wyoming Commission its only power, the court continued, and in this instance
the Wyoming Commission had no support for its actions.103 Furthermore, in
this case the utility was acting as a private entity, and as such, the Wyoming
Commission acted beyond its jurisdiction in ordering how MST&T was to
outsource its directory-publishing division.104
Modern proponents of deregulation and restricting commission
interference rest much of their rationale on this decision. The court rebuked
language limiting the Invasion of Management defense that California courts
had proffered a year earlier, and reopened the door for this defense to public
utility companies across the United States. The Invasion of Management
defense again required that commissions only regulate areas impressed with
direct consumer–utility contact, and even within this area, commissions could
only regulate what services were to be provided.
While recent decisions continue to reflect this rejuvenation of the defense,
other courts continue to uphold commission decisions that involve direct
contact between the consumers and the utility. In Arizona Corp. Commission
v. State ex rel. Woods,105 for example, the Attorney General of Arizona refused
to certify three rules proposed by the Arizona Corporation Commission (the
“Arizona Commission”) giving it governance over transactions between public
utilities and their affiliates.106 The Arizona Commission’s proposed rules
included (1) definitions, (2) reporting requirements, and (3) approval
provisions.107 The latter two requirements were challenged by the Attorney

100. Id. at 568 (quoting 677 P.2d 799, 807 (Wyo. 1984)).
101. Id. at 569 (quoting 670 P.2d 349, 354 n.10 (Cal. 1983)).
102. In re Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 745 P.2d at 569.
103. Id. at 571.
104. See id. at 569, 571.
105. 830 P.2d 807 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc).
106. Id. at 808.
107. Id. at 810.
The [reporting requirements] require notice from any utility or affiliate intending to
organize or reorganize a public utility holding company. The notice must disclose
specific information regarding the proposed holding companies: the officers and directors
and their business purposes, various financial and organizational information,
diversification plans, and anticipated changes in the utility’s costs and services. The
informational rules also permit the Commission to gain access to an affiliate’s books and
records regarding its transactions with a public utility. Finally, the rules require annual
reports from utilities and their holding companies regarding diversification plans and
business activities between affiliates and the utility.
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General of Arizona on behalf of more than twenty different state utility
companies.108
The court began by looking at the historical background of the
commission, finding that several ideological groups at the Arizona
Constitutional Convention of 1910 “shared a strong distrust of corporate
powers,” and joined forces to promote a strong commission.109 The Arizona
Constitution also seemed to give more extensive power to the Arizona
Commission than the Virginia and Oklahoma constitutions, even though
Arizona’s constitution was patterned after these states’ constitutions.110 The
court then looked to precedent in this area and concluded “that the
Commission has no regulatory authority under [the constitution] except that
connected to its ratemaking power,” but that deference must be afforded to the
Commission to determine which regulations are necessary to protect rates.111
The Court ultimately found that the Arizona Commission must be given the
power to prevent transactions in advance in order to protect ratepayers from
potential losses.112
In a similar decision, the Supreme Court of New Mexico supported a
commission’s decision preventing a utility from implementing tariffs to fund
“optional service” programs.113The optional service programs would have
allowed the utility to provide to its customers utility-related services that were
not part of the utility’s essential gas or utility business.114 The court
recognized that while a commission’s regulation of public utilities is limited, it

The approval rules require utilities to obtain Commission approval of the
organization or reorganization of utility holding companies. These rules also require
Commission approval of transactions by which utility corporations acquire or assume any
financial interest in, or liabilities of, certain affiliates, lend to those affiliates, or use utility
funds to form a subsidiary.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 811–12. “As one influential framer, Michael Cunniff, argued, ‘in almost every
state . . . corporations have altogether too much influence in the [state’s] direction and control.’”
Id. at 812 (quoting JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF ARIZONA 435 (Cronin
comp. 1925), quoted in John D. Leshy, The Making of the Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1, 89–90 (1988)).
110. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 830 P.2d at 812.
111. Id. at 815. “While diversification may be a wise financial decision for utility companies
in some or even most instances, many critics ‘fear that financial improvement through
unregulated diversification will come at the expense of utility ratepayers.’” Id. at 817 (quoting
Fickinger, supra note 15, at 95).
112. Id. at 818.
113. In re Application of PNM Elec. Servs., A Div. of Pub. Servs. Co. of New Mexico v.
New Mexico Pub. Util. Comm’n, 961 P.2d 147, 152 (N.M. 1998).
114. Id. at 148–49.
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was permissible in this case because substantial evidence showed that the
program would pose risks to rates.115
In re Application PNM Electric Services seems to permit a commission to
regulate an area not involved with direct contact between the consumer and the
utility. Therefore, this opinion has been cited in numerous cases and
secondary sources to support commission intervention.116 In reality, however,
Arizona now adheres to a broader construction of commission power than
other jurisdictions, making it unlikely that an invasion of management
argument would prove successful Arizona.117
Other states, however, still adhere to the framework intrinsic to invasion of
management principles. For example, in Public Service Co. v. State ex rel.
Corp. Commission,118 the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC) filed a
rule change to close what they viewed as a “loophole” in Rule 60, which
allowed some electric consumers to switch suppliers without cost.119 To
prevent the loophole, the OCC changed the word “consumer” to “electric
consuming facility.”120 With this change, people who could once move into a
new apartment and choose an electric supplier without cost were now required
to either maintain the previous renter’s electric provider or pay the changeover
cost.121 The Public Service Company of Oklahoma (PSC of Oklahoma) urged
that this requirement should be eliminated because the costs of switching are
often prohibitive to the consumer, and thus, did not allow consumers to choose
their electric provider.122
The PSC of Oklahoma further argued that this constituted interference with
internal management decisions, and as such, was not permitted by the

115. Id. at 153.
116. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sandel v. N.M. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 980 P.2d 55, 60 (N.M. 1999);
Martinez v. N.M. State Eng’r Office, 9 P.3d 657, 662 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000); 73 C.J.S. Public
Administrative Law and Procedure § 106–07 (2004); Judy Sheldrew, Shutting the Barn Door
Before the Horse Is Stolen: How and Why State Public Utility Commissions Should Regulate
Transactions Between a Public Utility and Its Affiliates, 4 NEV. L.J. 164, 170 (2003).
117. See, e.g., In re Application of PNM Elec. Servs., 961 P.2d at 151–52.
118. 918 P.2d 733 (Okla. 1996).
119. Id. at 734, 736.
Rule 60 provides the procedure which must be utilized by a consumer, having available two or
more electric suppliers, to switch from one supplier to another. In the event of such a switch by
the consumer, the rule requires that the costs be paid to the replaced supplier by the acquiring
supplier. The acquiring supplier is then forced, by Rule 60, to pass on the costs of the switch to
the consumer.
Id. at 734.
120. Id. at 736.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 736, 738.
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Oklahoma Constitution.123 While the PSC of Oklahoma agreed that the OCC
could protect the public’s interest when regulating rates, it disagreed with the
OCC’s proposed interference into how the PSC of Oklahoma established new
service.124
To resolve the issue, the court looked to prior authority, first citing
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Corp. Commission125 for its language
constraining the authority of a commission: “[A commission] may regulate
functions of corporations falling within its jurisdiction, only if the activity is
impressed with public interest.”126 In other words, there must be direct contact
between the consumer and the utility.
Next, the Public Service court considered Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v.
Corp. Commission,127 where the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the OCC’s
attempt to disallow the construction of a new generation station.128 The court
stated “the Constitution does not clothe [the OCC] with the general power of
internal management and control incident to ownership,” nor does it confer
“either expressly or by necessary implication, the power to regulate, supervise
and control the internal management and control of a public utility.”129 In
effect, the court in Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. found that there was no
public necessity that would permit the OCC to intervene.
123. Pub. Serv. Co., 918 P.2d at 738. The court noted that the Oklahoma Constitution at
Article 9, section 18, includes precise limitations on the OCC’s authority directly bearing on the
case at bar:
The [OCC] shall have the power and authority and be charged with the duty of
supervising, regulating and controlling all transportation and transmission companies
doing business in this state, in all matters relating to the performance of their public duties
and their charges therefor . . . and to that end the [OCC] shall, from time to time, prescribe
and enforce against such companies, in the manner hereinafter authorized, such rates,
charges, classifications of traffic, and rules and regulations, and shall require them to
establish and maintain all such public services, facilities, and conveniences as may be
reasonable and just . . . .
Id.
124. Id. at 739.
125. 672 P.2d 44 (Okla. 1983).
126. Pub. Serv. Co., 918 P.2d at 739 (quoting Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 672 P.2d at 44). In Missouri
Pacific Railroad Co., the court held that a commission’s order requiring railroads to provide
lockers to their employees was not within the commission’s authority. 672 P.2d at 45.
127. 543 P.2d 546 (Okla. 1975).
128. Pub. Serv. Co., 918 P.2d at 739 (citing Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 543 P.2d at 551).
129. Id. (quoting Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 543 P.2d at 551–52). The court in Oklahoma Gas &
Electric Co. concluded by quoting Lone Star Gas Co. v. Corp. Commission:
The powers of the Commission are to regulate, supervise, and control the public service
companies in their services and rates, but these powers do not extend to an invasion of the
discretion vested in the corporate management. It does not include the power to approve
or disapprove contracts about to be entered into, nor to the approval or veto of
expenditures proposed.
Id. (quoting 39 P.2d 547, 552 (Okla. 1934)).
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With this precedent in mind, the court turned to the instant case and
explained that the OCC’s order requiring consumers to bear changeover costs
is impressed with direct contact between the consumer and the utility, but is
contrary to precedent in that area because it dictates how new service will be
established.130 The court rationalized its decisions, stating that if a commission
is concerned that switching costs borne by the utility will result in general rate
increases, a commission should simply refuse the rate increase when the utility
proposes it.131 Consequently, as recently as 1996, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma has issued an opinion cast in the Invasion of Management rationale.
As is often the case, however, this court did not explicitly call the commission
order they overturned an “Invasion of Management,” even though it adhered to
the same rationale.
Thus, while the Invasion of Management defense continues to live on in
most states, important questions continue to linger around the label itself.
Whether the label will continue to be used is a question for future courts.
However, this framework would have provided a more efficient way for the
court to analyze the FERC’s order in the Westar decision. For that matter, the
Invasion of Management defense could prove to be a more efficient analysis
for all courts who encounter similar issues of questionable regulation by public
utility commissions.
III. WESTAR ENERGY’S PROPOSED BOND ISSUANCE
The FERC, in its recent Westar decision, imposed four new restrictions on
any public utility’s issuance of debt (secured or unsecured), and explicitly
stated that “it is the Commission’s intention that these restrictions will be
applied to all future public utility issuances of secured and unsecured
debt . . . .”132 The FERC went on to “remind public utilities that section 204
[of the Federal Power Act (FPA)] gives the FERC Commission the authority to
issue supplemental orders, and modify the provisions of any previous
order . . . .”133 The depths of this decision and its future implications encroach
on areas of management formerly inaccessible to commission power. Before
discussing the implications of this decision, however, one must understand the
background against which it was decided.
A.

Background

In September of 2002, Westar applied for authorization to issue long-term,
unsecured debt in the amount of $650 million, in compliance with section

130.
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 740.
Id.
Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. 61186, 61512 (2003), 2003 WL 732901.
Id. at 61512–13.
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204(a) of the FPA.134 Westar, pursuant to the FERC’s request for additional
financial information, filed details relating to its current debt load, future debt
requirements, and reasons why the proposed issuances were in the public’s
best interest.135 The Kansas Corporation Commission (KCC) and MBIA
Insurance Company (MBIA) then filed motions to intervene in the FERC’s
proceedings.136
The KCC expressed concerns about Westar’s financial situation, namely
its capital structure and debt obligations.137 Although the KCC made clear that
it did not oppose Westar’s potential debt issuance, it did emphasize that the
issuance must be unsecured for the KCC’s approval to remain intact.138
MBIA, on the other hand, insured the bulk of Westar’s bonds secured by the
mortgage pledge of Westar and Kansas Gas and Electric Company (KG&E), a
subsidiary of Westar.139 MBIA stated that it had “become alarmed at . . .
recent indications regarding troubling financial and management issues with
Westar.”140 MBIA went on to recommend that the FERC exercise caution and

134. Id. at 61510. The FPA section 204(a) is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824c(a) and provides:
No public utility shall issue any security, or assume any obligation or liability as
guarantor, indorser, surety, or otherwise in respect of any security of another person,
unless and until, and then only to the extent that, upon application by the public utility, the
Commission by order authorizes such issue or assumption of liability. The Commission
shall make such order only if it finds that such issue or assumption (a) is for some lawful
object, within the corporate purposes of the applicant and compatible with the public
interest, which is necessary or appropriate for or consistent with the proper performance
by the applicant of service as a public utility and which will not impair its ability to
perform that service, and (b) is reasonably necessary or appropriate for such purposes.
The provisions of this section shall be effective six months after August 26, 1935.
16 U.S.C. § 824c(a) (2000).
135. Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. at 61510.
136. Id.
137. Id. There was an undertow at this time that Westar was mismanaged and swimming in
debt due in large part to its unprofitable investment in unregulated subsidiaries such as Protection
One. John Hanna, Westar to Sell Non-utility Assets, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 7, 2003, at E6 (“Critics
have said Westar’s investment in Protection One drained the company’s finances, though Westar
executives have maintained Protection One’s management improved over the past two years,
creating operating cash.”). These concerns likely stemmed from a view that regulated utility
customers were being forced to pay the higher cost of utility-secured debt associated with nonutility Westar affiliates. See id.
138. Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. at 61510.
139. Id.
140. Id. In its motion to intervene, MBIA went on to outline recent events that had created
concern regarding Westar’s financial strength. Motion to Intervene of MBIA Insurance
Corporation at 3, Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. 61186 (2003) (No. ES02-51-000). First,
MBIA was concerned over the KCC’s recent order requiring Westar to restructure its operations
to protect ratepayers. Id. Next, several grand jury investigations into executive activities brought
MBIA some anxiety. Id. Finally, MBIA was apprehensive of Westar’s attempts to restructure in
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seek out all appropriate information in considering Westar’s proposal.141 Thus,
this notice of intervention served as the first sign that Westar’s past managerial
decisions were under consideration. Both the KCC and MBIA recommended
intervention into the “troubling” management of Westar, evoking great
concern from the FERC in a time shortly after the disasters associated with the
Enron and WorldCom collapses.
The KCC then established additional requirements for Westar by filing two
motions to lodge its orders with the FERC, detailing financial and corporate
restructuring obligations.142 The FERC did not allow Westar to answer the
KCC’s or MBIA’s motions for intervention because good cause was not
shown.143 However, Westar did respond to the KCC’s complaints, explaining
that its proposed refinancing was in response to current debt that matured in
the near future, and that “without the ability to refinance Westar could
potentially face a liquidity crisis.”144
B.

The FERC’s Decision

Section 204 of the FPA requires utilities to obtain permission from the
FERC before issuing or assuming any securities.145 Furthermore, before the
FERC will approve the request, a utility must establish a lawful purpose and
some necessity for the issuance.146 Although the FERC concluded that Westar
met these statutory requirements,147 the FERC conditioned Westar’s request on
a few additional stipulations.148 First, the new debt must only be used to retire
outstanding indebtedness, and second, quarterly status reports of its corporate
condition must be filed with the FERC.149
The FERC then established new restrictions, explaining that it would
“impose four additional restrictions and it is the Commission’s intention that

the face of opposition by the KCC and the restrictions imposed by the Investment Company Act
of 1940. Id.
141. Id.
142. Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. at 61510. Westar was required to provide monthly
reports on Westar’s debt situation; reduce secured utility debt by $100 million per year; gain the
KCC’s approval before Westar issued any new debt; separate utility subsidiaries from non-utility
subsidiaries; and minimize unfavored accounting problems among Westar’s affiliates. Id.
143. Id. at 61510–11.
144. Id. at 61511.
145. 16 U.S.C. § 824c(a) (2000).
146. Id.
147. Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. at 61511 (explaining that “the proposed issuance of
long-term, unsecured debt is for a lawful object within Westar’s corporate purposes and is
necessary, appropriate and consistent with Westar’s performance as a public utility”).
148. Id. at 61512.
149. Id. FERC imposed one additional condition, stating that “Westar must file a Report of
Securities Issued within 30 days after the sale or placement of the long-term, unsecured debt, as
stated in the Commission’s regulations.” Id.
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these restrictions will be applied to all future public utility issuances of
secured and unsecured debt authorized by this Commission.”150 These four
restrictions, outlined below, proved to be the most controversial, and have
sparked concerns about the FERC’s authority in this area.151
First, public utilities seeking authorization to issue debt that is secured (i.e.,
backed) by utility assets must use the proceeds of the debt for utility purposes
only. Second, with respect to such utility asset-secured debt issuances, if any
utility assets that secure such debt issuances are divested or “spun off,” the
debt must “follow” the asset and be divested or “spun off” as well.
Third, if assets financed with unsecured debt are divested or “spun off,”
the associated unsecured debt must follow those assets. Specifically, if any of
the proceeds from unsecured debt are used for non-utility purposes, the debt
likewise must “follow” the non-utility assets and if the non-utility assets are
divested or “spun off” then a proportionate share of debt must “follow” the
associated non-utility assets by being divested or “spun off” as well. Last,
with respect to unsecured debt used for utility purposes, if utility assets
financed by unsecured debt are divested or “spun off” to another entity, then a
proportionate share of the debt also must be divested or “spun off”.152

The FERC noted that because of these additional requirements, future
public utilities will be prevented from borrowing to finance non-utility
businesses, and will thus act more in the public’s best interests.153 And with
that simple edict, the FERC added requirements that no other public utility
before Westar had been forced to comply with. Although the FPA allowed the
FERC to condition approval of a debt issuance on a showing of lawful purpose
and necessity, there was no authority cited for the FERC’s additional four
requirements.154 Because of this absence of authority, current concerns have
driven cries of over-regulation and apprehension over what other areas of
management the FERC will soon attempt to control.
Since the Westar Order, the FERC has wavered on the new restrictions
that were to apply “to all future public utility issuances of secured and
unsecured debt . . . .”155 Within a year of the Westar Order, Kandiyohi
Electric Cooperative (Kandiyohi), a Minnesota company, submitted an
application under section 204 of the FPA156 and part 34 of the Federal Energy

150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. See Salamone et al., supra note 41, at 30.
152. Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. at 61512.
153. Id.
154. See id.; 16 U.S.C. § 824c(a) (2000); see also Application of Kandiyohi Power
Cooperative for Authority to Issue Securities at 12, 106 F.E.R.C. 61010 (2004) (No. ES04-6-000)
[hereinafter Application].
155. Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. at 61512.
156. 16 U.S.C. § 824c.
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Regulatory Commission’s Regulations157 for authorization to issue
securities.158 Because it would use such debt to finance both its regulated and
unregulated activities, Kandiyohi sought exemption from the four criteria
established by the FERC in the Westar Order.159 Specifically, Kandiyohi
sought exemptions from the criteria set forth in the Westar Order for both
member-owned cooperatives in general, and for itself in particular.160
Kandiyohi explained that the commission in Westar was concerned over
Westar’s credit rating and the shaky financial condition of the utility.161
Furthermore, Kandiyohi noted the following:
The Westar restrictions appear to be designed to prevent investor-owned
utilities’ (IOUs) stakeholders and management, whose interests are or may be
different than the interests of utility customers, from taking actions which may
ultimately jeopardize the utility’s ability to perform its utility function and may
adversely affect its rate payers.162

However, Kandiyohi argued that cooperatives are not susceptible to similar
conflicts between owners and customers because cooperatives are owned by
their customers (ratepayers).163 Consequently, Kandiyohi argued that the
Westar restrictions were not justified, even though it qualified as a public
utility company.164
Kandiyohi then argued that the Westar restrictions were beyond the scope
of the FERC.165 “[S]ection 204 of the FPA does not expressly prohibit public
utilities from issuing securities to finance non-utility activities.”166 Kandiyohi
explained that the FERC instituted the restrictions in Westar to prevent utilities
157. 18 C.F.R. §§ 34.1–34.10 (2003).
158. Application, supra note 154, at 1.
159. Id. at 8–9.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 9. Kandiyohi elaborated on the commission’s decision in Westar, stating:
These policy concerns arose in large part because the financial condition of IOUs, such as
Westar, had deteriorated in large part due to their non-utility business activities. With
regard to Westar, the Commission found that since 1995 Westar had issued substantial
amounts of new debt and used the proceeds to finance non-utility business ventures and to
cover operating losses incurred by non-utility business. These activities resulted in the
following adverse consequences: the credit rating for Westar securities was reduced to
“junk status”, Westar debt is more costly and more difficult to obtain on economically
favorable terms, Westar’s ratepayers are at risk for paying the increased cost of debt if
Westar cannot generate enough cash flow from utility operations to cover the increased
debt costs; and Westar will be left with a disproportionate amount of debt if it “spins off”
some or all of its non-utility businesses.
Id. at 9 n.10.
162. Id. at 9–10.
163. Application, supra note 154, at 10.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 12.
166. Id.
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from impairing their ability to function as regulated public utilities.167 In this
instance, however, Kandiyohi argued that its use of utility asset-secured debt
will not inhibit its ability to act as a utility, but will actually benefit the utility
by funding its affiliated propane business.168 In essence, this was the exact
same argument Westar made one year earlier in its efforts to fund its affiliate
“Protection One.”169
The FERC ultimately agreed with Kandiyohi and issued an order
authorizing the issuance of the securities, exempting Kandiyohi itself from the
Westar criteria, but denying the request to exempt all member-owned
cooperatives.170 The FERC stated that “the Westar restrictions are not needed
to protect Kandiyohi’s utility customers, and we will not impose them in this
instance.”171
Several months later, Midwest Energy, Inc. (Midwest), a Kansas utility
company, filed a request pursuant to section 204 of the FPA to issue securities,
and asked for the same exemption from the Westar criteria that Kandiyohi had
received.172 Midwest argued that it should also be exempted from the FERC’s
requirements due to its ownership composition and the benefits that Midwest
would derive from the financing.173 The FERC subsequently approved
Midwest’s application for the requested exemption and cited the Kandiyohi
Order without providing additional justification.174

167. Id.
168. Application, supra note 154, at 12.
Adequate financial support of its propane business allows Kandiyohi to diversify its
interests protecting the financial security of the utility and its owner-customers. Further,
ensuring access to affordable propane supplies in rural areas served by Kandiyohi may
encourage residents and current member-owners of the cooperative to remain in
Kandiyohi’s electric service area.
Id. See generally Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. 61186 (2003), 2003 WL 732901.
169. Kandiyohi was basically conveying the sentiment of the Invasion of Management
rationale: absent a specific grant of statutory authority, the commission should not be permitted to
dictate how a utility provides its services to the public.
170. Kandiyohi Power Cooperative, 106 F.E.R.C. 61010, 61024 (2004), 2004 WL 45465.
171. Id.
172. Application of Midwest Energy, Inc. for Authority to Issue Long-Term and Short-Term
Debt at 3, No. ES04-17-000 (F.E.R.C. Mar. 26, 2004). Midwest was going to use the utility
asset-secured debt to fund one of its affiliates, Midwest United Energy (MUE). Id. at 10. “MUE
is a natural gas marketer that provides Midwest Energy’s commercial and industrial customers
with the option of accessing competitively-priced supplies of natural gas. In addition, all profits
earned by MUE are for the benefit of all of Midwest Energy’s customer-owners.” Id.
173. Id. at 10.
174. Letter from Michael C. McLaughlin, Director, Division of Tariffs and Market
Development, Federal Energy Regulatory Comission, to William N. Dowling, Vice President,
Energy Management & Supply, Midwest Energy, Inc. (May 5, 2004), available at
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/nvcommon/NVViewer.asp?Doc=10148472:0.
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Thus, while the FERC originally intended that its new restrictions apply to
all future public issuances of debt, it has since relaxed its requirements. The
restrictions imposed on Westar stemmed from abuses at Westar and other
IOUs that used regulated asset-secured debt to fund unregulated businesses to
the advantage of the stockholders.175 The FERC could have simply denied
Westar’s request in the first place instead of imposing new requirements on all
utilities. Since the Westar decision, the FERC has refused to grant a
broad/generic exemption to the Westar requirements to a group, but they have
granted exemptions to individual entities when good cause was shown. The
fact that the FERC has issued specific exceptions to the Westar order
immediately after developing the new requirements may indicate that the
FERC did not envision the scope of the order it was handing down. Thus, had
the Invasion of Management defense been properly applied in the original
Westar opinion, the FERC could have avoided the numerous utilities that have
and will request exemptions to the Westar requirements. Moreover, the FERC
will certainly face additional scrutiny from the large number of utilities that
currently diversify into unregulated affiliates.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC UTILITY DIVERSIFICATION
Public utilities rarely diversified prior to the mid 1970s, during which time
public utilities were experiencing increasing profits due to a slow rise in
costs.176 However, after this period, regulated utilities began to see their
financial positions deteriorate, spurring diversification into unregulated areas
of business.177 This allowed utilities to operate a portion of their business free
from regulation imposed by commissions.178
By preventing public utilities from financing non-utility businesses with
debt secured by utility assets, the FERC effectively limited the ability of a
utility to obtain favorable financing for non-utility investments. Although
some commentators have called for a statutory response to diversification into
non-utility businesses,179 the FERC chose to formulate a response based on a

175. Unregulated investments are generally intended solely to benefit the stockholders, and
recent abuses have underscored this fact. Customers, on the other hand, often times do not
benefit from this funding.
176. Fickinger, supra note 15, at 91.
177. Id.
“Increased costs are attributable to inflation, high interest rates, stricter
environmental controls, and other regulatory requirements.” Id. at 91 n.26 (citing CABOT
CONSULTING GROUP, DIVERSIFICATION IN THE UTILITY INDUSTRY 2–3 (1982)). Furthermore,
“[a]s inflation has continually eroded interest coverage ratios for utilities since the 1960’s, bond
rating agencies have responded by downgrading utility bond ratings and other security ratings.
This trend began in earnest in 1972. Accordingly, in the electric utility industry, stocks have sold
below book value since 1973.” Id. at 91 n.28.
178. Id. at 91–92.
179. See, e.g., id. at 116.
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broad provision in the FPA, absent specific statutory support.180 Moreover,
commissions do have limits beyond those specifically outlined in statute, and
the Invasion of Management defense attempts to preserve public utility
autonomy by upholding these limits. “[A] comprehensive grant of public
service commission jurisdiction extending over the public utility holding
company’s non-utility operations must consider the limited levels of funding,
manpower, and expertise available to commissions for this task.”181 If these
resources are not available to commissions, there would be no interests served
by extending a commission’s jurisdiction.182 Thus, when the FERC extended
its jurisdiction to include Westar’s non-utility businesses, it greatly decreased
the chance that any public utility will divest in unregulated affiliates in the
future. This is a major blow when one considers the competitive advantages
sustained by larger diversified companies.183
Several states have facilitated public utilities in their efforts to diversify.
In Maryland, for example, the Maryland Public Service Commission rejected a
proposal that would require utilities to obtain approval prior to any
diversification initiatives, including diversification into unregulated
180. See Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. 61186, 61512–13 (2003), 2003 WL 732901.
Section 204 of the FPA requires utilities to obtain permission from FERC before issuing or
assuming any securities. 16 U.S.C. § 824c(a) (2000). Furthermore, before FERC will approve
the request, there must be a showing of a lawful purpose and that there is some necessity for the
issuance. Id. Subsection (b) of this act gives the commission broad power to supplement these
orders:
The Commission, after opportunity for hearing, may grant any application under this
section in whole or in part, and with such modifications and upon such terms and
conditions as it may find necessary or appropriate, and may from time to time, after
opportunity for hearing and for good cause shown, make such supplemental orders in the
premises as it may find necessary or appropriate, and may by any such supplemental order
modify the provisions of any previous order as to the particular purposes, uses, and extent
to which, or the conditions under which, any security so theretofore authorized or the
proceeds thereof may be applied, subject always to the requirements of subsection (a) of
this section.
Id. § 824c(b); see Application, supra note 154, at 12 (stating that “section 204 of the FPA does
not expressly prohibit public utilities from issuing securities to finance non-utility activities”).
181. Fickinger, supra note 15, at 116–17. The Commission is composed of five
commissioners who are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 16
U.S.C. § 792 (2000). This group is in turn given the power “to appoint, prescribe the duties, and
fix the salaries of, a secretary, a chief engineer, a general counsel, a solicitor, and a chief
accountant; and . . . such other officers and employees as are necessary in the execution of its
functions . . . .” Id. § 793.
182. Fickinger, supra note 15, at 117.
183. See Frank J. Hanley & A. Gerald Harris, Does Diversification Increase the Cost of
Equity Capital?, 128 PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 15, 1991, at 26, 26 (explaining that diversification
decreases the total risk and subsequently the cost of equity to utilities); Michael V. Russo et al.,
Adding On: How to Make Diversification Work, 131 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 15, 1993, at 21, 25
(describing the factors associated with and the benefits derived from successful diversification).
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subsidiaries.184 The commission opined that “the state’s public service law
only granted authority over rates and public utility services offered by a
regulated company. Preapproval of diversification activities was, thus, not
required to assure just and reasonable rates and adequate provision of regulated
services.”185 Consequently, the FERC’s new restrictions could have major
implications in striking the balance between commissions and public utilities
that diversify into unregulated businesses. While states may afford greater
freedom to the portion of public utility business that they govern, it is clear that
the FERC will restrict some portions that they control.
It is also important to note that the FERC’s concerns arose primarily from
Westar’s “shaky” financial condition. Thus, one must question why the FERC
sought to impose its regulations on all future utilities. Prior case law would
indicate that the new restrictions imposed on all future public utility companies
were unnecessary. Opponents of diversification into non-utility businesses
may argue that the utility customer should not be required to fund
diversification investments that disproportionately benefit the shareholders
over the customers. These opponents, however, should draw on the precedent
provided in Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Commission.186
There, the court found that consumers cannot bear the risk of a faulty project
unless the company obtains approval from the commission prior to undertaking
the project.187 Thus, had Westar been attempting to pass on the costs of a
failed project to its consumers, the commission could have justifiably stepped
in.188 Westar, however, was only engaged in a debt issuance that could have
negative implications in the future, but currently only constituted a decision of
management. If Westar’s affiliate, Protection One, would someday prove
unprofitable, Westar would have to bear the cost of the failure instead of
consumers.

184. Phillip S. Cross, MD. Rejects Restrictions on Diversification, 133 PUB. UTIL. FORT.
Nov. 1, 1995, at 45, 45. Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (BG&E) entered into a new business
venture and began marketing merchandise and services in the area of kitchen remodeling. Id.
Ratepayers argued that BG&E was subsidizing this program from rates obtained through their
regulated electric and gas business. Id.
185. Id.
186. 677 P.2d 799 (Wyo. 1984).
187. Id. at 808–09. The utility company could not levy the cost of a failed nuclear power
construction project against ratepayers. Id. at 806.
188. The Supreme Court of Wyoming has explained that a commission “is empowered to
control the effect that new energy projects will have on rates—but only after the utility
management has assessed the merits and drawbacks of the proposal and reached a final decision
based on sound business judgment . . . .” Id. at 810.
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V. THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
The FERC recently promised to pursue other actions to prevent events
similar to the Enron collapse and the California energy crisis.189 Specifically,
FERC Chairman Pat Wood, III explained that “(1) FERC will seek to ensure
‘the right rules’ are in place to encourage strong competition in energy
markets; and (2) FERC will make efforts to monitor those markets more
vigilantly.”190 The Westar conditions that will be imposed on all future debt
issuances and the reporting requirements for all public utilities are examples of
these initiatives at work.191 All future initiatives, however, should be analyzed
under the Invasion of Management rationale.
Thus, in order to come full circle, the Westar decision must be reconciled
with the Invasion of Management rationale.
Courts regularly hold
commissions’ actions “illegal,” but fail to provide a useable test for future
courts to apply with some form of uniformity.192 If a test or standard is to be
established, however, it “must be deduced from specific decision rather than
from wandering opinion.”193 Consequently, one must piece together the
rulings discussed in this Comment to understand the impact the Invasion of
Management defense should have had on the Westar decision.
As the cases outlined in this Comment have indicated, most statutes, on
their face, only grant commissions the power to regulate public utilities when a
utility’s actions could impact rates.194 However, general grants often
accompany this power, and must be limited by the Invasion of Management
defense. A strict method of statutory interpretation195 would provide public
utilities with the independence that management is entitled to have, and it
would also establish a test that courts could uniformly apply in interpreting
general statutory grants. Although there are gray areas in general grants of
power, courts should err on the side of management and allow the capitalist
189. See Salamone et al., supra note 41, at 30.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Management Invaded, supra note 23, at 118.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-101b (2002); MO. REV.
STAT. § 393.140(5) (2004).
195. According to Black’s Law Dictionary:
Strict construction of a statute is that which refuses to expand the law by implications
or equitable considerations, but confines its operation to cases which are clearly within the
letter of the statute, as well as within its spirit or reason, not so as to defeat the manifest
purpose of the Legislature, but so as to resolve all reasonable doubts against the
applicability of the statute to the particular case.
Strict interpretation is an equivocal expression, for it means either literal or narrow.
When a provision is ambiguous, one of its meanings may be wider than the other, and the
strict (i.e., narrow) sense is not necessarily the strict (i.e., literal) sense.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 333 (8th ed. 2004) (citations omitted).
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society that we operate in to take care of the rest. It is clear that when states
provide statutory grants of power to commissions, “the generally worded
grants of power clearly refer to those services and facilities in the area of direct
contact between the utility and the consumer.”196 In addition, cases have
shown that “[c]ommission orders are uniformly upheld when the managerial
decision ‘invaded’ is clearly within the area of direct consumer-utility
contact.”197
Westar’s proposed bond refinancing was well within management’s
prerogative, and arguably outside the area of direct contact between the utility
and the consumer. Furthermore, even if financing an unregulated affiliate does
involve direct contact between the utility and the consumer, commissions are
not permitted to regulate how a utility provides services.198
Had the court analyzed the Westar case under the Invasion of Management
framework, the FERC’s new requirements would almost certainly have been
prohibited, and problems in Kandiyohi and Midwest would have been avoided.
As such, the Invasion of Management defense would have provided a clear test
for the FERC to adhere to in issuing its order. Less than ten miles away from
Westar’s headquarters, a Kansas court explained the commissions’ bounds in
the area of debt financing many years prior to the Westar Order, stating:
It must be kept in mind, of course, that the regulatory commission does not
have the actual authority to revise a utility’s capital structure, per se, or to
order the utility to change it into a different setup. That is a prerogative of
management which cannot be superseded by the substitution of regulatory
opinion—that is to say, how much debt should be incurred or common stock
issued.199

Investors in public utilities must continue to receive protection from
overzealous commissions. These investors have a right to not only manage
their property (a right indivisible from ownership), but also to earn a fair return
on their investment.200 Moreover, numerous policy considerations exist for
limiting utility regulation.201
First, the physical composition of commissions restricts their ability to
competently enter into the management of a public utility.202 Commissions are
limited in personnel, time, and funding, and often lack a background of
196. Management Invaded, supra note 23, at 118.
197. Id. at 119.
198. Intuitively, financing a business deals with how a utility provides services to its
customers.
199. Sekan Elec. Co-op. Ass’n. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 609 P.2d 188, 191 (Kan. Ct. App.
1980) (quoting E. NICHOLS & F. WELCH, RULING PRINCIPLES OF UTILITY REGULATION, RATE
OF RETURN SUPPLEMENT A 157 (1964)).
200. Management Invaded, supra note 23, at 125–26.
201. Id. at 126.
202. Id.
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practical experience that would permit knowledgeable management of a
utility.203 Commission’s decisions are necessarily based on “vicarious
knowledge” composed of statistics and theories, rather than internal knowledge
derived from long-term contact with utility operations.204 Furthermore,
commissions frequently come under heavy pressure from consumer groups and
civic groups lobbying for lower rates and extra services.205 Commissions often
forget that their duty is to the public as a whole and not solely to the special
interest group that complains the loudest.206
Finally, and most importantly, continual regulation of public utilities can
do nothing but weaken privately owned utilities.207 “If effective private
management of utilities is paralyzed by continual forays of regulation, in the
long run the public could be hurt most seriously by a continuing decrease in
efficiency.”208 Intuitively, one can easily understand that a business that
continually becomes less profitable will also be less attractive to investors. It
necessarily follows that incentives to invest will dwindle, along with
compensation of upper-echelon management, middle management, and all
other employees. As a result, public utilities will become less efficient and
poorly managed, eventually resulting in rate spikes to reverse the cycle.
Consequently, the Invasion of Management defense is of practical
application to any commission regulation that is not impressed with direct
consumer–utility contact. When applied correctly, the defense prevents
commissions from continual forays into the management of a utility, forays
that could ultimately prove detrimental to the utility and the public.209
Moreover, the opinions in this area either expressly, or based on their rationale,
indicate that the Invasion of Management defense is not moribund. In the
wake of Enron, and other similar situations, applying the Invasion of
Management defense is a difficult task, but one that must be taken to preserve
the model of public utilities that the United States currently operates under.
The defense supplies a rationale that courts can apply much easier than wading
through wandering opinions as many recent courts have been inclined to
undertake. Regardless of the disasters associated with deregulation in

203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Management Invaded, supra note 23, at 126. These special interest groups commonly
“ignore the rights of owners to a fair return and unfettered management of their property within
the proper limits.” Id.
206. Id. at 127.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. As previously discussed in this Comment, if management is over-regulated, public utility
companies could eventually become unattractive to investors, creating financial difficulties for
the utility companies and ultimately increasing prices offered to consumers. See supra text
accompanying notes 200–08.
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California and the Enron crisis, “deregulation has brought consumers in certain
states lower prices, greater choice, greater efficiency in generation,
transmission, and distribution, preservation of reliable service, and
environmental preservation.”210
So, after more than fifty years, one question remains: What areas of
management were truly intended to remain with management? As the cases
indicate, the test for when management has been invaded remains unclear to
this day. However, it is important to recognize that commissions cannot act
beyond the intent of the general grants provided by state and federal
legislation. To do so would not only undermine the management of the public
utility, but could also erode the current system by eliminating any profitability
incident to private ownership. It is important to again note that “utility
regulation . . . depends on[] private ownership and management. Nothing so
far discovered in the Constitution prohibits public ownership of all utilities. If
the state legislatures had wished to own and manage utilities they could have
done so.”211 As a result, courts must strike a balance between over-regulation
and regulation necessary to protect the public. To do so, the rationale intrinsic
to the Invasion of Management defense must be considered.
THOMAS R. DOWLING*

210. Waller, supra note 16, at 755.
211. Management Invaded, supra note 23, at 126.
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